Vincent Tijms reviewed Free Agents by Kevin J. Mitchell
An essay on putting agency back in cognitive science
5 stars
This book is easy to love. In fact, I've already given out multiple copies, as there is so much to like about an argument that draws on evolutionary biology, neuroscience, physics and psychology to argue in favour of free will. Mitchell proves to be the right person for the job, too, as he treats the different fields he traverses with curiosity and rigour.
That being said, the work is essayistic rather than analytical, exploring what a naturalist account of agency could be like, before reflecting on what that would mean for the debate on free will. This exploratory approach may not be for everyone, but I enjoyed it very much, especially because Mitchell brings in important and relatively novel insights to make his point, such as the active inference literature from cognitive science or indeterminacy in classical systems from physics. There's a lot about these topics that is tentative or …
This book is easy to love. In fact, I've already given out multiple copies, as there is so much to like about an argument that draws on evolutionary biology, neuroscience, physics and psychology to argue in favour of free will. Mitchell proves to be the right person for the job, too, as he treats the different fields he traverses with curiosity and rigour.
That being said, the work is essayistic rather than analytical, exploring what a naturalist account of agency could be like, before reflecting on what that would mean for the debate on free will. This exploratory approach may not be for everyone, but I enjoyed it very much, especially because Mitchell brings in important and relatively novel insights to make his point, such as the active inference literature from cognitive science or indeterminacy in classical systems from physics. There's a lot about these topics that is tentative or even ambiguous (which is fun) and it is testament to how development in cognitive science are putting expressiveness and individuality back at the core of the research programme.
It does help that my personal convictions are very much aligned with those written down by Mitchell, but I do think the book can be enjoyed by readers with an opposite perspective -- e.g. those who believe free will is not compatible with determinism and that neural and mental processes are deterministic. What I am not sure of, however, is how accessible the book is for those who are not already attuned to cognitive neuroscience. Mitchell's style is definitely smooth, yet the concepts he deals with are pretty high-level and might require some hard work by readers with relatively low inclusion.
Regardless, if you find the issue of agency and free will fascinating, this is probably one of the best current works out there, whether you're interest is mostly biological, mostly cognitive or mostly philosophical.